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Over the past decade, the international business community
has witnessed a considerable growth in the size and
complexity of executive compensation packages. This
growth has been lauded by some and lamented by others.
Those who recognize the importance of attracting the best
corporate talent to their company might consider today's
soaring compensation rates to be well worth the expense.
Those who believe in an unbridled fee-market economy
would argue that the wealth bestowed by a corporation
upon its executives reflects the true value of the services
executives provide. On the other side of the debate, there
are those who would advocate a more egalitarian
distribution of wealth within society, or who would
consider today's compensation rates to be unfair to
shareholders or to the company itself
Performance-based compensation has been introduced as a
supposed check on run-away executive compensation. In
theory, the issuance of stock options should fall into the
category of performance-based compensation. This note
addresses an emerging compensation practice that has
blunted the performance-based motivating effect of some
stock option grants: the issuance of spring-loaded options.
Spring-loaded options allow a compensation committee to
offer near-guaranteed and near-instantaneous wealth to
corporate executives. This note will examine the practice,
legality, and advisability of granting spring-loaded options
in executive compensation packages. This note also
addresses the question, "Should this practice be
regulated?"
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I. INTRODUCTION: A LOOK AT THE TRENDS IN EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
Compensation packages for corporate executives have come a long
way. That is, they have grown remarkably in measures of(1) size and (2)
creative complexity.
A look across time at the average compensation packages for
corporate executives illustrates the first point. Joann Lublin and Scott
Thurm of The Wall Street Journal indicate that "[t]he average [pay for chief
executives of large companies in 2005] was $10.5 million, a figure that
includes salary, bonus and the value of stock and stock-option grants."1
This figure represents a rapid increase in pay since the mid 1990s. 2 To
illustrate just how much of an increase this figure represents, consider that
in a 1991 survey of compensation packages for CEOs of the country's
biggest companies "[t]he median total CEO compensation [in 1990],
including salaries, bonuses, and long-term compensation was $1.4
million."3 Although this is a look at mean versus median compensation
rates, the figures remain indicative of rapid growth.
To give further perspective to the rapid rise of executive
compensation since 1990, a look further back in time is illuminating. In
1936, big companies offered their top executives an average of "about
$95,000, according to MIT's Professor Frydman, equivalent to $1.4 million
in today's [2006] dollars."4 Note that the relative value of these 1936
corporate compensation packages matches the value listed above for the
median total CEO compensation packages in the country's biggest
companies in the 1990s. In other words, executive compensation did not
change much in measures of size from 1936 to 1990. In the 1930s, these
payouts were thought to be generous and were considered symptomatic of
the perceived greed of American corporations at the time.5  Lublin's
October 12 article in The Wall Street Journal suggests that despite the
growing prosperity of the post-war decades, these figures changed very
little "reflecting... more egalitarian societal values. '6
Lublin states that in the late 1970s, corporations began to pursue
new and creative forms of executive compensation "[a]fter a decade-long
bear market soured executives on stock and stock options."7 Some of the
Joann S. Lublin & Scott Thurm, Behind Soaring Executive Pay, Decades of Failed
Restraints, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, at Al.2 Id. at A16.
3 Amanda Bennett, Executive Pay (A Special Report) - Hard Times Trim CEO Pay
Raises: But Stock Options Set the Stage For Big Future Gains, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17,
1991, at RI.
4 Lublin, supra note 1, at A]6.51id.
6Id.
7id.
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compensation packages offered to corporate executives created, in theory,
incentives for high performance on the part of the executives. Iman
Anabtawi, in the North Carolina Law Review explains, "[c]ompensation is
the principal means by which companies in the United States seek to
motivate managers to act in the best interests of shareholders." S  For
example, traditional stock options, with their intrinsic motivational
qualities, continued to be widely offered.9 "By giving executives options,
supporters of the practice say, top managers have a strong incentive to raise
the value of the company's shares."' 0
A further example of motivational compensation components is
provided by golden parachutes. A golden parachute is "a termination
severance payment agreement which shelters executives from the effects of
a change in corporate control."' ' These generous payments are guaranteed
to executives in the event that their company is taken over and aim to
prevent executives from blocking deals that might be in the best interest of
the company.
On the other hand, some of the compensation packages offered to
executives do not appear to be strictly performance oriented. Signing
bonuses, guaranteed bonuses, and enhanced pension packages all fall into
this category because executives do not have to undertake any extra care or
duty in order to obtain them. Though these might, strictly speaking, not be
performance oriented, some will argue that any form of an attractive
compensation package is useful for drawing the most successful, powerful
executives into the company.
More recently, stock options have also entered the domain of
compensation not strictly oriented to performance. This is due to
opportunistic practices related to timing. In the 1990s, the practice of
backdating stock options erupted onto the scene, capturing the attention of
America with a series of high-profile corporate corruption cases highlighted
by the national and international media.12 Backdating further enhanced the
8 Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835, 835 (2004).
9 Stock options are contracts offered by companies, in this case, to their executives. The
options allow the executive (or any holder of the options) to buy shares of the company
in the future at the price of those shares at a specified date. Stock options offer the
holder an opportunity to win on the markets without the usual corresponding risk of
loss. If the stock gains value after the date on which they were granted, the holder may
exercise the option to buy and gain the difference in value. If the stock fails to gain
value or in fact loses value after the options have been granted, the holder may simply
choose not to exercise their option to buy the stock, thereby avoiding any loss. See id
at 840.
10 Jonathan Peterson, SEC Broadens Stock Option Investigation, L.A. TIMES, June 20,
2006, at C1.
11 Jay Zitter, Annotation, "Golden Parachute" Defense to Hostile Corporate Takeover,
66 A.L.R. 4th 138 § 1(2)(a) (1988).
12 Backdating of stock options "means retroactively picking an option grant date earlier
than the date on which the board, compensation committee, or other corporate official
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attraction of stock options by, in effect, creating instantaneous wealth when
the options were exercised. While the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") and the general media have long had backdating in
their sights, a new timing-related options practice has more recently come
to the SEC's attention: the lesser-known practice of issuing spring-loaded
options.
In response to growing federal concern with corporate ethics,
including the contentious issue of the increasing quantity and complexity of
executive compensation, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
2002.13 SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, speaking at the International
Corporate Governance Network's 11th Annual Conference, pointed out that
as a result of this legislation "companies have been subject to tougher
internal control requirements, and have filled compensation committees
with independent directors. More importantly, the SEC requirement for
disclosure of stock option grants to executives and directors has been
greatly accelerated to two days from the previous one-year requirement.',
14
This aspect of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation directly affected the practice
of backdating options in executive compensation. Jonathan Peterson of the
Los Angeles Times points out that "[b]efore the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate
reform law, companies could have several weeks or even months in which
to report their options grants. But the 2002 law cut those deadlines to two
business days, greatly reducing wiggle room on the dates."' 5
Presently, federal concern and a federal willingness to intervene in
executive compensation have been demonstrated. The elections of
November 2006 saw a turnover of parties in Congress. With this turnover,
new committee chairmen are setting new goals and agendas. Senator Max
Baucus (D) of Montana, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, is
advocating "higher taxes on executive compensation. 16 In the other house
of Congress, Representative Barney Frank (D) of Massachusetts, Chairman
of the House Financial Services Committee, is advocating "more
actually approved the grant in order to use a lower stock price in effect on the earlier
date as the option exercise price." Brian E. Pastuszenski, Stephen D. Poss & Marian A.
Tse, The Current Regulatory Focus on Options Dating Practices, MONDAQ, July 20,
2006, available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid-41400&searchresults
-1. The timing of an options grant can have a significant impact on the value of the
grant. Iman Anabtawi's article points out that "most options are granted as of the date
the award decision is made with an exercise price that is equal to the market price of the
company's stock on that date (that is, 'at the money')." Anabtawi, supra note 8, at 843.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
14 Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the International Corporate
Governance Network 1 lth Annual Conference (July 6, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news
/speech/2006/spch070606psa.htm.15 Peterson, supra note 10, at C1.
16 Sarah Lueck, Executive Pay Looks to Take Hit, Democratic Congress Gets Tough on
Compensation Packages, WALL ST J., Jan. 30, 2007, at A4.
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shareholder power over executive pay. 17 On Thursday, February 1, 2007,
the Senate voted to pass its version of a new minimum-wage increase bill.' 8
According to Jim Kuhnhenn of the Associated Press, this bill differed from
the House version in that it would forbid executive contributions into tax-
deferred compensation plans beyond $1 million per year, or beyond "100
percent of the average annual salary over a five-year period."' 9 This bill
faced the challenge of being reconciled with House Democrats who insisted
"they [wanted] a minimum wage bill with no strings attached."2 °
Ultimately, facing the combined opposition of business lobbies and a House
reluctance to tie the bill to executive compensation, this component of the
Senate's version of the minimum-wage increase bill was dropped.21
The Democratic Party's "increasingly populist appeal" can
certainly be cited as an important factor in the federal government's current
22willingness to intervene in executive compensation. The need for a
politically acceptable target in raising budget revenues would also appear to
be a driving force. Sarah Lueck of The Wall Street Journal reports that
"[d]emocrats 23 have pledged to live within pay-as-you-go budget
constraints that require new spending or tax breaks to be offset by budget
cuts or revenue increases. Under those rules, executive pay makes a more
tempting target than, perhaps, raising middle-class taxes, or cutting popular
spending programs. 24
Against this backdrop of exponential growth in the volume and
complexity of executive compensation, this Note will explore the more
recent practice of granting spring-loaded options as a part of executive
compensation packages. This note will consider the legality of issuing such
options, along with the benefits and detriments inherent to the practice.
Finally, this note will address the question, should the issuance of such
17 Id These examples not withstanding, the Democratic Party is not unanimous in its
interventionist approach to executive compensation. Representative Charles Rangel
(D., N.Y.), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee stated, "I don't want to
get involved in people's salaries." Id
18 Kate Zernike, Senate Passes Wage Bill, but Obstacles Await, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2007, at A15.
19 Jim Khunhenn, Senate Backs Wage Boost with Pro-business Provisions, DAILY
BREEZE, Feb. 2, 2007, at A8.
20 Id.
21 Lori Montgomery, Minimum-Wage Accord Produces Protests, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
2007, at D1. Ironically, though this component of the Senate's bill met its demise, the
House's wish for a "clean" minimum-wage hiking bill without strings attached has
potentially been thwarted by further modifications. A subsequent attempt to pass
minimum-wage legislation involved attaching the proposed wage hike to an Iraq
spending bill. Id.
22 Lueck, supra note 16.
23 The author of this note does not intend, through the inclusion of this excerpt, to
indicate that the use of such factors in deciding tax policy is confined to any one
political party.
24 Lueck, supra note 16.
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options be regulated? While the need for SEC regulation of increasingly
opaque compensation packages may be apparent to many, doubts haunt the
issue. In light of how the U.S. corporate environment is perceived
internationally to be restrictively over-regulated, is further regulation of
executive compensation a good idea?
II. WHAT ARE SPRING-LOADED OPTIONS?
Spring-loading refers to two related practices: (1) granting stock
options shortly before a public release of positive information or (2)
granting stock options shortly after a public release of negative information.
On the one hand, stock options might be granted shortly before a
public release of positive information about the company that is likely to
increase the value of the company's stock. Simply put, this is "timing
grants to come ahead of good news.,,25 The public release of positive
information is presumably followed by a rise in the company's stock price.
This creates opportunity for the same instant wealth that occurs in the
practice of backdating stock options. The stock options are fixed to the pre-
release price for the options holders, and this fixed price is effectively
guaranteed to be below the new post-release value of the stock. When the
holders (in this case corporate executives) exercise the option to purchase
the stock, the value of the stock obtained is in excess of the price they spent
in the purchase.
On the other hand, stock options might be granted shortly after a
public release of negative information that is likely to decrease the value of
the company's stock. This is "offering [grants] after bad news. 2 6 This
form of spring-loading has also been called "bullet dodging." 27 A drop in
the company's stock price presumably follows the public release of
negative information. Stock options are then granted to the executive, and
they are exercised while the stock value is lower than usual. As time
passes, the value of the stock presumably rises once again, benefiting the
holder of the options.
Both of these practices involve choosing an advantageous date on
which to grant the options to the corporate executive. Both approaches
"aim to capture presumed lows in stock prices for the options' strike
prices. 28  Both also aim to increase the value of the options for the
recipient.2 9 Either of these practices involves a grant of options "at the
money," or "with an exercise price that is equal to the market price of the
25 Alix Nyberg Stuart, The Spring-loaded Options Trap, CFO MAGAZINE (2006),
available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7851837/c7873404?f-magazine
alsoinside.
26 Id.
27 id.
28 Id.
29 Peterson, supra note 10, at C1.
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company's stock on that date., 30 This is significant because at-the-money
options are afforded advantageous accounting treatment.3' This
classification might be seen as a point of contention. For example, a
carefully timed spring-loaded option will presumably quickly turn into an
option "in the money" (meaning the option's strike price is below the
market price) when the pending good news is released to the public.
A related tactic that produces much the same effect as spring-
loading is for a company to maintain a set schedule for the granting of stock
options to executives. The company may then take advantage of this set
schedule by manipulating the dates of the release of positive or negative
company information to the public. This practice attempts to avoid the
impression of stock options manipulation, but it is effectively a
manipulation of the back-half of the equation - the timing of the release of
value-affecting information to the public.
32
Ill. ARE SPRING-LOADED OPTIONS LEGAL?
A. What is the SEC's Stance on Spring-Loaded Options?
With a dubious eye on the manipulative nature of granting spring-
loaded options, many critics have questioned the legality of such grants. In
fact, until very recently the legal status of the practice remained gray and
murky.33 In an era promoting compliance with the spirit of the law, some
have considered the risk of such a practice to outweigh the benefit. To
illustrate how serious these considerations are, "[a] Justice Department
official recently testified that fraud in options grants could bring lengthy
prison terms and fines in the millions of dollars. 3 4 Further, Alix Nyberg
Stuart reports in CFO Magazine that in November of 2005, "Analog
Devices spent $3 million to settle spring-loading charges with the SEC. ' 35
Against this backdrop of criminal and civil liability, are spring-loaded
options legal? The short answer to this question is yes.
On August 29, 2006, the SEC released its new rules affecting
executive and director compensation and related disclosures in Release
36Number 33-8732A. National interest in the changes to executive
compensation rules has been overwhelming. According to SEC Chairman
30 Anabtawi, supra note 8, at 835.
31 See id.
32 Id.; Peterson, supra note 10, at CI.
33 Stuart, supra note 25.
34 Peterson, supra note 10, at C .
35 Stuart, supra note 25.
36 Executive Compensation and Related Personal Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229,
232, 240, 245, 249, 274 (2007). This release is available on the SEC's website at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/finalarchive/finalarchive2OO6.shtml (last visited May
12, 2007).
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Christopher Cox, in a speech addressing a SEC open meeting on July 7,
2006, "[w]ith more than 20,000 comments, and counting, it is now official
that no issue in the 72 years of the Commission's history has generated such
interest. ' ,37 It would appear that corporate America had long awaited this
SEC release.
Under the new rules, "Form 8-K 38 requirements significantly
increased the number of filings related to executive compensation. ',39 Item
5.02 of Form 8-K now requires "companies to include additional
information regarding material employment compensation arrangements
involving named executive officers ... ,40 In addition, a new disclosure
requirement includes the "'Compensation Discussion and Analysis'
(CD&A) section, which replaces the traditional compensation committee
report and will be in addition to a new and different compensation
committee report. 41 These new rules took effect on November 7, 2006,
and the compliance date was set for mid December of 2006.
These rules, for the first time, required disclosure of executives'
entire compensation packages, including:
* the objectives of the company's compensation
program;
* what the compensation program is designed to reward;
* each element of compensation;
* why the company chooses to pay each element;
* how the company determines the amount (and, where
applicable, the formula) for each element of
compensation; and
* how each compensation element and the company's
decisions regarding that element fit into the company's
overall compensation objectives and affect decisions
regarding other elements.42
This disclosure requirement, according to Chairman Christopher
Cox of the SEC, "will give investors a much clearer picture of exactly how
37 Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Chairman Cox Addresses SEC Open Meeting, US
FED. NEWS, July 26, 2006.
38 The SEC's webpage explains that "[florm 8-K is the 'current report' companies must
file with the SEC to announce major events that shareholders should know about." SEC,
Form 8-K, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
39 SEC Amends Related Person Transaction, Corporate Governance and Form 8-K
Disclosure Requirements, Procter Client Alert at p. 5 (Sept. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/getfile.aspx?filepath-/Files/Publications/CA-Governa
nceRules 9 11 06.pdf.
40 Id.
41 Laura G. Thatcher, SEC Releases Final Rules on Disclosure of Executive and
Director Compensation, 61 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV., Issue 4, Oct. 2006, at 13.
42 -
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much they're paying the executives who work for them. 43 Addressing an
open meeting of the SEC in July of 2006, Chairman Cox explained that
these new rules "will give companies an opportunity to explain their
compensation policies, and to share with investors how they arrived at the
particular levels and forms of compensation for their highest paid
executives. '44 Cox elaborated, "Shareholders and their representatives need
intelligible disclosure that can be understood by a lay reader without benefit
of specialized expertise, and without an advanced degree.,
45
Chairman Cox stated that these rules are premised on the idea that
the SEC considers the practice of granting options in executive
compensation to be a legitimate method of compensation, "and there is
nothing inherently wrong with choosing any particular date or using any
particular methodology for determining an option's strike price - as long as
it is fully and fairly disclosed to shareholders and properly accounted for.",
4 6
In the face of these comprehensive new requirements, "the Commission has
made it clear that it is not in the practice of judging the propriety of a
company's executive compensation program. 4 7
The new requirements also include:
* Disclosure of the full grant date fair value of an option
at the time the award was actually made;
* A comparison of the exercise price to the grant date
market price, whenever the exercise price is lower than
the market price;
* Disclosure of the date when the compensation
committee took action on an option grant if that date
differs from the grant date; and
* A plain English description of how the company
determined the timing of option awards to executives.48
This requirement of "plain English" descriptions should have the
effect of helping shareholders, compensation committee members, and
43 Cox, supra note 37. The new rules also require that as of 2006, companies must list
an expense for the stock options granted. This new stipulation was faced with its own
challenge: how do you value the options grant? In a January 25, 2007 letter, SEC Chief
Accountant Conrad Hewitt concurred with the view of the vice president of Zions
Bancorporation of Salt Lake City, that an auction system designed by that company
could be used "as a market-based approach to valuing employee share-based payment
awards" in employee stock options. Letter from Conrad Hewitt, Chief Accountant,
SEC, to James G. Livingston, Vice President, Zions Bancorporation (Jan. 25, 2007) (on
file with author), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/staffletters/zions
012507.pdf. See also David Reilly & Serena Ng, SEC Clears Market-Based Way To
Value StqffStock Options, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2007, at C5.
44 Cox, supra note 37.
45 Id.
46 id.
47 Thatcher, supra note 41.
41 Cox, supra note 37.
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board members to understand exactly what is included in the compensation
package, and why it is included, even if those individuals do not have a
specialized knowledge of finance. It is significant that disclosure makes
this information available to board members and shareholders, rather than
simply to compensation committees. "Due to the complexity of executive
compensation matters, compensation committees typically rely on
professional compensation consultants for advice. . . . Frequently,
consultants are hired to evaluate the compensation of the CEO who hired
them. ' 49 Full disclosure helps to counter potential conflicts of interest that
might easily arise in such arrangements.
Chairman Cox elaborated, "Among the most important features of
these new rules is that there will now be one bottom-line number, including
all options, for an executive's total compensation. And that number will be
comparable from company to company." 50 This bottom-line number should
ease the process of comparing the compensation packages offered. This
should ease comparisons of executive to executive, and comparisons of
company to company.
Along with the backdating of options, spring-loading is "not
technically illegal, provided the company's compensation committee was
not deceived in any way",51 according to Stuart's article in CFO Magazine.
SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, in his speech at the I 1th Annual
Conference of the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN),
put it this way: "Specifically, we need to ask ourselves whether there has
been a securities law violation even if a nexus can be identified between the
grant and the news event., 52 His statement makes it clear that the mere
presence of a nexus between the options grant and the release of
information does not per se make the grant illegal. Under the new SEC
regulations, spring-loaded options are permitted as long as corporate
governance guidelines are adhered to, including full disclosure to the board
and to the shareholders.53
Chairman Cox's and Commissioner Atkins' remarks indicate that
spring-loading is legal. Does that sit well? If so, why have there been so
many critics?
49 Anabtawi, supra note 8, at 850.
50 Cox, supra note 37.
51 Stuart, supra note 25.
52 Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the International Corporate
Governance Network 1 lth Annual Conference (July 6, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spchO70606psa.htm.
53 Cox, supra note 37.
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B. What About the Question of Insider Trading?
The SEC has spoken. What then, is the cause for concern? Critics
of the practice might be quick to state that spring-loaded options stink of
insider trading.
On this topic, remarks from the SEC appear to be less clear.
Concerning the practice, Cox has stated that the SEC is "concerned with
misbehavior in using inside information to time the granting of options.,
54
On the other hand, SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins, has stated that spring-
loading is not insider trading, "because no one is harmed."5 5 How do these
statements mesh? Atkins further clarified that while exercising their
business judgment, "[b]oards . . .should use all the information that they
have at hand to make option-grant decisions .... An insider-trading theory
falls flat in this context, where there is no counterparty who could be
harmed by an options grant. The counterparty here is the corporation - and
thus the shareholders. 5 6
Further bolstering this statement, "Peter Romeo, former chief
counsel of the SEC, was quoted as stating that he did not believe the insider
trading rules would apply to the grants because actual share trading was not
involved."57
Professor Dale Oesterle,5 8 of The Ohio State University's Moritz
College of Law, has explained the current state of the law on this subject in
his Business Law Prof Blog:
Is this or should this be illegal? . . . The answer is
complex. The practice is illegal if the company delays
news that it should disclose so as to grant the options but is
not illegal otherwise as long as the option grants and the
news are disclosed within SEC mandated deadlines. It is
similar to making stock grants to executives before good
news is announced. It is not "insider trading," it is a form of
compensation that is an alternative to a cash grant.
Whether the executives deserve the value depends, first, on
whether they are performing well in their positions and,
second, on proper procedure (whether an independent
54 Peterson, supra note 10.
55 Vineeta Anand, 'Spring-loading' not Insider Trading SEC Official Says 'Well-timed
Options' Benefit Investors, Hous. CHRON., July 7, 2006, at Business 4.
56 Kara Scannell et al., Can Companies Issue Options, Then Good News? SEC is
Divided on Practice Known as 'Spring Loading;' Critics See 'Insider Trading', WALL
ST. J., July 8, 2006, at Al. For a developed argument that spring-loaded options grants
to executives are good for shareholders, see infra Section IV(A).
57 Anabtawi, supra note 8, at 838 n.8 (quoting Timothy D. Schellhardt, Options
Granted During Takeover Talks Are Boon for Executives at Fore Systems, WALL ST. J.,
May 14, 1999, at C1).
51 Professor Dale A. Oesterle: Gilbert J. Reese Chair, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio
State University, Columbus Ohio, 2003 to present.
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board of directors has made the decision). The only
argument is with the timing of the disclosure -- the SEC
could force companies to disclose the practice before the
grant of options or stock rather than a few days after
(current practice).59
Taking these statements together, the SEC will be concerned with a
misuse of inside information - specifically in the form of the issuance of
spring-loaded options without the required disclosure of the practice, and
disclosure of the rationale to the shareholders. The SEC may deem a failure
to disclose to be misleading to the shareholders.
IV. SHOULD SPRING-LOADED OPTIONS BE ALLOWED, OR NOT?
Opinions differ sharply when the question is considered: Does the
practice of issuing spring-loaded options provide a benefit or a detriment to
the markets? SEC Commissioner Atkins has stated that it does not harm
shareholders. Critics would argue the point. Various arguments have
surfaced to defend either side of the issue.
A. Arguments For The Use of Spring-Loaded Options
One of the most public proponents of the use of stock options in
general, including spring-loaded options, is Commissioner Paul Atkins of
the SEC. In his speech noted above, Atkins indicated that spring-loading
benefits shareholders by enabling fewer but more valuable options to be
granted to executives. 60 This, in turn, enables the issuance of lower
salaries. 61 Atkins stated, "It is cheaper to pay a person with well-timed
options than with cash., 62 Atkins pointed out that issuing spring-loaded
options allows a compensation committee to obtain "the biggest bang for
the buck.'63 By that, Atkins means that the practice of spring-loading
allows a company to issue fewer options, because the options that are
granted are more valuable. Atkins elaborated, "Fewer option grants would
mean that existing shareholders would face less dilution from additional
shares in the marketplace. 64
These decisions (how much compensation to offer an executive,
and in what format to offer it) involve factors that will be most familiar to
the business judgment of a corporate board and its compensation
59 "Spring Loaded" Compensatory Stock Options, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
business law/2006/07/spring loaded c.html (July 10, 2006).
60 Anand, supra note 55.
6 1 id.
62 id.
63 id.
64 Tom Petruno, When Manipulation Might Equal Fraud, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2006, at
C2.
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committee. Speaking to this issue, Commissioner Atkins states, "Boards, in
the exercise of their business judgment, should use all the information that
they have at hand to make option-grant decisions. 65 Atkins elaborates,
"Who are we to second-guess that decision? Why isn't that decision in the
best interests of shareholders?, 66 If granting fewer options, which have
attractive potential for growth in value, is cheaper for the corporation,
perhaps the use of spring-loading can be in the best interests of the
shareholders, and the corporation itself. More than compensation is at
stake: voting rights and power on the board are directly implicated.
Regardless of the shadowy history of spring-loaded options, the
present and future use of this practice would appear benign under the
present regulations. Even as an attempt to manipulate the value of a
component of an executive's compensation package, "executives can argue,
truthfully, that there is no way to know for certain how the market will react
to impending news. 67 Much of the concern that moved the SEC to act
stemmed from the mysteriously opaque nature of the compensation
packages that were being granted. Not only were shareholders and board
members unaware of the makeup of the packages that were being granted, it
is also safe to say that many were not even aware of what spring-loading
was, or whether it was legal. The SEC has acted to remove the mystery
surrounding the legality and presence of spring-loaded options in corporate
executive compensation packages.
B. Arguments Against The Use of Spring-Loaded Options
While the SEC has decided to allow the regulated practice of
spring-loading, some critics continue to denounce its use. 6 8 The issue has
been considered a gray or murky one.
Before the August SEC ruling, the practice was seen by many to be
simply another way around the compensation regulations already in place
with overtones of insider trading. Companies have had to spend large sums
to try to avoid prosecution. Kevin Cameron, president of shareholder
advisory firm Glass, Lewis & Co., has stated that "[r]ight now boards all
over the country are hiring outside counsel and forensic accounting experts
65 Pasteszenski et al., supra note 12.
66 Anand, supra note 55.
67 Helen Shaw, Is Spring-loading Wrong?, CFO MAG. FOR SENIOR FIN. EXECUTIVES 5,
Sept. 6, 2006, available at
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/78801157/c 2984338?f-options.
6' Arguing against the notion that the issuance of spring-loaded options would result in
increased retention of benefits by shareholders, Damon Silvers (Associate General
Counsel for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
organizations) says "It's also true that if you let your employees steal from the cash
register, you don't have to pay them that much .... " Anand, supra note 54. See also
Miller, infra note 71.
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to look at their option practices.,,69  Now that the SEC has moved to
regulate the practice, a question remains as to how effective this regulation
will be in producing transparent disclosure. Lynn Turner, formerly Chief
Accountant at the SEC, denounced the practice of spring-loading. He states
that, of the companies accused of spring-loading, "the disclosures of stock
option grants 'have been grossly misleading and false .... Investors were
misled and executives failed to tell the truth, which is a violation of
securities law."'
70
Critics of the practice of spring-loading argue that the practice
undermines the intended performance incentive of stock-option grants. As
discussed above, stock option grants to corporate executives are, in their
pure form, beneficial to the shareholders at large. An executive who has
been granted options will have personal motivation to do everything
possible to raise the value of the company's stock. When the stock has
accrued value, he may then exercise his options and reap the benefit of the
difference between his options' set price and their actual value. The use of
well-managed spring-loaded options, on the other hand, might do more to
guarantee quick wealth for the executive, and reduce the long-term efforts
otherwise required of an executive to raise the value of the stock."
Apart from the criticisms that spring-loading "rigs" the options
grants for easy profits, it is also said that the practice raises the specter of
deceptive business practices. One of the effects of spring-loading is to
provide a means for the manipulation of public information in the expense
report. It is argued that "[i]t would take an extreme optimist, nay, a totally
naYve person, to believe that the directors would spring-load the options
without noticing that doing so minimizes the reported expense."' 2 While an
executive may be awarded an eventual $100 million in value through the
use of spring-loaded options in his compensation package, the corporation
may report a significantly smaller figure in its expense reports.
Executives might be interested in hiding part of their pay package because,
at a certain point, "even directors who are inclined to favor management in
the compensation process will refuse to approve a compensation package,
or shareholders might seek to impose limits on executive compensation.",1
4
69 Petruno, supra note 64.
70 Shaw, supra note 67.
71 In response to the argument that the practice of spring-loading allows fewer options
to be granted to the executive, thus saving the company money, critics might point out
that the wealth of the shareholder is still being transferred to the employee. lf$100
million is the compensation required to secure the services of an executive, that money
will ultimately be awarded to the executive, regardless of how many options are
involved in the package.
72 Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, Spring-loading: SEC's Atkins Misses the Point,
WEB CPA, Sept. 4, 2006, http://www.webcpa.com/article.cfm?articleid-21737&pg-
acctoday&printyes.
73 ld.
74 Anabtawi, supra note 8, at 852.
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Investors may view this practice as a subterfuge or a distortion of facts, and
lose trust.
75
V. SHOULD THIS PRACTICE BE REGULATED?
Regardless of the arguments for or against the use of spring-loaded
options in executive compensation packages, the SEC has decided to allow
the practice to occur in a regulated form. Should this practice be regulated?
Past attempts at regulation of executive compensation may provide insight
into whether regulation of spring-loading will be effective.
A. Rule Changes In Executive Compensation: Historic Reactions to New
Regulations
In 1993, federal securities regulators acted to address the perceived
run-away compensation packages offered to corporate executives.
According to Joan Lublin of The Wall Street Journal, the regulators took
the step of forcing companies "to reveal details about pay and perks for top
officials, in some cases for the first time., 76 The intent of this regulation
was to increase the transparency of executive compensation, and to promote
informed decisions when compensation plans were being approved. Lublin
reports that "[s]ince then, the average pay for chief executives of large
companies has quadrupled, according to Kevin Murphy, a professor at the
University of Southern California's Marshall School of Business. ''77 In
2005, the average large company chief executive compensation was $10.5
million.8 This market reaction took regulators by surprise.
Several factors can undermine the effects intended by rules
regulating compensation. An executive compensation race-to-the-top may
be encouraged by the transparency that results from disclosure rules. As
corporate compensation figures are disclosed, executives gain insight into
what their peers earn in competing companies. 79 Executives who wish to
push for richer compensation packages are given readily available chips
with which to negotiate. Companies that wish to gain or maintain the
services of an effective executive have been forced to compete with other
companies to offer a competitive compensation package.
Another factor that can undermine regulations of executive
compensation has been likened to Jell-O. Kayla Gillan, appointed by the
SEC as a founding member of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, and previously the general counsel to the California Public
Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), states that efforts to regulate
71 See Miller, supra note 72.
76 Lublin, supra note 1.
77 id.
78 id.
79 id.
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executive compensation are "like moving Jell-O... [when compensation is
squeezed in one place] ... it squirts out in another."80 For example, in 1984
Congress passed a tax on golden parachutes. This bill "taxed awards valued
at more than three times an executive's average compensation over the
previous five years."81 The effect of this new tax regulation was to increase
executive pay. The tax effectively "blessed the existence" of golden
parachutes and brought that form of executive compensation to the attention
of companies, and into increased use. Further, the passage of this law
inspired creativity in compensation packages. "Gross up" tax
compensations8 2 began to be offered to cover the cost of the new taxes . 3 If
the intent of this regulation was to rein in run-away corporate compensation
packages, the effect was certainly the opposite.
Lublin states that one of the stipulations of the 1993 regulation was
that "companies could no longer take tax deductions on executive
compensation of more than $1 million, unless it was related to
performance.' 's Here, the intention of the law was undermined by a new
executive perception that this cap represented a "minimum wage for
CEOs. 8 5  The regulation also sparked a creative growth of "'less
transparent forms' of pay, such as pensions and deferred compensation.,
8 6
In 2004, reports Lublin, "accounting rulemakers finally required
stock-option grants to be treated as an expense. ' 7  True to pattern,
compensation packages adapted in response. While fewer stock options
were granted, more restricted stock was granted. Here, the intention to
regulate executive compensation was undermined by another potentially
detrimental side effect: the potential loss of performance-based
compensation. "[U]nlike options, restricted stock retains [some of] its
value even if share prices decline."88 Yet this effect is not universal - some
companies have become more interested in performance-based pay.
This brings us to the present. In August of 2006 the SEC once
again has modified its rules to further regulate corporate executive
compensation." History would seem to indicate that the market will find a
way around compensation regulations. Are these new disclosure
regulations a good idea?
80 Id.
81 d. at A16.
82 Gross up tax compensations mean that the company will cover what would have been
the executive's liability under the tax, leaving the executive with the pre-tax value of
the compensation package. See Id.
84 Id.
84 Lublin, supra note 1.
85 id.
86 id.
87 id.
88 Id.
89 Executive Compensation and Related Personal Disclosure, supra note 36.
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B. Is Regulation Really a Good Thing?
Jennifer Hill, in her Wake Forest Law Review article, points out that
"[a] management's disclosure obligations and its fiduciary duties to
maximize corporate and shareholder welfare coexist uneasily in the law." 90
There is a tension that can exist between full disclosures on the one hand
and a desire to withhold sensitive information from competitors or parties
with adverse interests on the other hand. A basic manifestation of this
tension may be seen in the "occasional desire of management to delay some
disclosure until a big deal is closed." 91
The far-reaching impacts of the Enron and WorldCom accounting
scandals would seem to make it clear that, despite some degree of burden
placed on businesses, some degree of regulatory oversight is needed to
protect shareholders. Do these new SEC regulations protect the delicate
balance between the interests of the corporation and the interests of the
shareholders?
C. Did The SEC Get it Right This Time?
In August of 2006 the SEC released further rules to regulate
executive compensation packages. 92  Spring-loaded options are allowed
under these rules, but their use is contingent upon the full disclosure to the
board and shareholders of the practice, the accounting behind the practice,
and the rationale behind the practice. Has the SEC discovered a workable
balance this time by not declaring a practice to be illegal, yet requiring
transparency? Or is this going to be yet another well-intended regulation of
corporate America which will produce unintended side-effects?
While the history of new regulations of executive compensation
would indicate cause for concern regarding unintended side-effects, the
present regulation may prove to be an exception to the trend. The SEC
through its ruling did not condemn or outlaw spring-loaded options. Its
mandate of full disclosure might just find the right balance - the best of
both worlds. Full disclosure might just protect corporate boards and
shareholders from unconscionable executive packages, while keeping the
corporation free to offer packages to potential executives in the format that
the board finds most beneficial to the corporation. If this proves to be the
case, the SEC's decision will prove to be a very good thing.
It can be argued that a full, true disclosure of executive
compensation details will not, in the long run, harm the interests of a
corporation. With similar disclosure taking place among all the companies
90 Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures To Maximize Performance-Based
Remuneration: A Case Of Misaligned Incentives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 109(2000).
91 Id.
92 Executive Compensation and Related Personal Disclosure, supra note 36.
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in the United States, such disclosure may help to ensure fair and
competitive executive compensation while protecting shareholders against
undue drains on the wealth of the corporation. Yet, with the expansion of
international enterprise, and international competition, the question
remains: Is more regulation really a good thing?
Another consideration has been forced upon federal regulators in
the aftermath of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. "American-style regulation" has
recently come under intense attack. Such intense regulation is regarded by
many as a primary culprit when domestic corporations move off-shore, and
when foreign corporations look elsewhere. According to The Wall Street
Journal, in 2005, "24 of the 25 biggest non-U.S. floats listed in London and
other offshore markets rather than in New York. ',93 It would appear that
American-style liability, the offspring of American-style regulation, is
something most executives and directors would prefer to avoid if at all
possible.
While this line of reasoning might be a popular perception of
America's new business climate, it does not represent the complete picture.
Keith Attoe, a Director of the China-based Migao Corporation, provides
another perspective of America's current regulatory climate. Mr. Attoe, via
telephone interview, stated that the direct effect of the new SEC regulations
was that it became more difficult for companies to be listed on the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE").94 The indirect effect was that a NYSE
listing became more prestigious.95 The implication is that if a company is
able to obtain the NYSE-listed status, it is perceived as a better company.
Referencing the different regulatory climates of the NYSE and the London
Stock Exchange ("LSE"), Mr. Attoe stated that in China, for a company "to
be established on the NYSE ... it is seen to be more prestigious than being
established on the LSE. , 96  Pointing out that there are benefits to be
weighed when listing in either New York or London, Mr. Attoe further
explained that part of the move of IPOs from New York to London is
simply a matter of businesses going where they can raise money.
Presently, a significant portion of Asian wealth (along with European
wealth) is situated in London.
VI. CONCLUSION
93 Corey Boles, London Remains an 1PO Draw, U.S. Changes Notiwithstanding, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 8, 2006, at C4.
94 Telephone Interview with Keith Attoe, President of Cognitive Finance Inc., Chairman
of the Attoe Foundation, and a Director of the Board of Migao Corporation (Apr. 27,
2007). Cognitive Finance is a proprietary derivative trading and director services
company.
95 id.
96 id.
97 id.
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Regulated spring-loaded options, as a component in executive
compensation packages, would appear to be here to stay for the indefinite
future. It is entirely possible that the SEC has found a workable balance
between the positions of advocates and critics of the practice: to allow
companies the full freedom to issue spring-loaded options, but to require
full disclosure of their presence and the rationale for their presence as part
of a compensation package.
While it is true that the IPO market has, to some extent, moved
offshore in the current atmosphere of American market regulation, the
presence or absence of this new regulation of spring-loaded options is not
likely to be much of a factor in any conceived attempt to woo this business
back. It seems that an avoidance of "American-style regulation" is only one
factor that has shifted corporate interest from New York to London. Other
important factors include the availability of funds for IPO's and the ideal
qualities of London itself. London is an historic center of commerce and
banking, it is within the rapidly expanding European Union, and it sits
strategically in Greenwich Mean Time. (This last aspect is significant,
because companies in London can do business with Asia in the morning,
with Europe during the day, and with America in the evening, in the same
working day.)
In its effort to find the delicate balance between under-regulation
(with a resultant atmosphere of unprotected shareholders) on the one hand,
and over-regulation (with further alienation of large business interests
within the American theatre) on the other hand, it is just possible that the
SEC may have protected both flanks this time. Time, and free enterprise,
will tell.

